The onward crush of Brexit appears to have reached the point where it will break Theresa May's government in the very near future. Since taking the job more than two years ago, May's efforts at a negotiated separation have only yielded a proposal where the United Kingdom remains a subject of EU bureaucrats while losing what little influence they did have to influence the bureacratic processes (archived). Meanwhile the Royals have found themselves occupied handling the US IRS as part of the fallout of Harry taking a foreign bride of common descent (archived).
Category Archives: UK
In Filing Begging For Sealed Charges Copy/Paste Mishap Confirms Assange As Target Of US Prosecutors
In a petition to the US District Court for Eastern Virginia, US Attorney G. Zachary Terwilliger and Assistant US Attorney Kellen S. Dwyer argue for issuing sealed charges in a case titled "United States of America v. SEITU SULAYMAN KOKAYI" with SEITU SULAYMAN KOKAYI presumably being a pseudonym for the defendant who may not be named. Except further down in the document a failure in redaction yields gold:
Another procedure short of sealing will not adequately protect the needs of law enforcement at this time because, due to the sophistication of the defendant and the publicity surrounding the case, no other procedure is likely to keep confidential the fact that Assange has been charged.
And a bit further down:
The complaint, supporting affidavit, and arrest warrant, as well as this motion and the proposed order, would need to remain sealed until Assange is arrested in connection with the charges in the criminal complaint and can therefore no longer evade or avoid arrest and extradition in this matter.
And so any order to seal the charges being leveled at Julian Assange is moot. If there are not already sealed charges against Assange in different pseudonymously obscured case, it can be assumed there will be in another regardless of the determination in this one. Full text below: Continue reading
Numerous Western Fiat "Governments" Pushing For New Wave of Internet Totalitarianism
The Australia's Department of Home Affairs published a statement, since deleted annoucing an agreement during a 5Eyes meeting to pursue measures "prevent illegal and illicit content from ever being uploaded"1 and this move among the 5Eyes has been comfirmed by French collaborator Macron who argued for measures rather similar to those being whispered by the Anglophone 5Eyes cartel (archived). Another since deleted memo2 originally published by the Australian Home Affairs referring to conclusions reached during the 5Eyes powwow suggests New Zealand's recent adoption of "Digital Customs Searches" is a preview of things to come for the rest of the totalitarian criminal Anglophone block.
Full statement since deleted:
This is Google's cache of https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about/national-security/five-country-ministerial-2018/countering-illicit-use-online-spaces. It is a snapshot of the page as it appeared on Oct 14, 2018 05:10:38 GMT. The current page could have changed in the meantime. Learn more. Full versionText-only versionView source Tip: To quickly find your search term on this page, press Ctrl+F or ⌘-F (Mac) and use the find bar. Home Menu Five Country Ministerial 2018 Access to evidence and encryption Countering the illicit use of online spacesCurrently selected Department of Immigration and Border Protection Ministers Contact us Report suspicious behaviour Search this site Search Individuals and Travellers Businesses, Agents and Trade Professionals Australian Border Force About Us About Us Five Country Ministerial 2018 Access to evidence and encryption Countering the illicit use of online spacesCurrently selected Skip Navigation LinksHome > About Us > National security > Five Country Ministerial 2018 > Countering the illicit use of online spaces Five Country Ministerial Statement on Countering the Illicit Use of Online Spaces We, the Homeland Security, Public Safety, and Immigration Ministers of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, stand united in our commitment to protect our citizens from child predators, terrorists, violent extremists and other illicit actors. We are as determined to counter these threats online as we are to counter them in the physical world. We note with disappointment that senior digital industry leaders did not accept our invitation to engage on critical issues regarding the illicit use of online spaces at the 2018 Five Country Ministerial meeting. Nevertheless, we reiterate our determination to work together constructively to ensure our response is commensurate to the gravity of the threat. Our citizens expect online spaces to be safe, and are gravely concerned about illegal and illicit online content, particularly the online sexual exploitation of children. We stand united in affirming that the rule of law can and must prevail online. We are committed to an open, safe and secure internet; one that provides global connectivity, better access to services, and new ways to conduct business and share news and information. But we recognise that the anonymous, instantaneous and networked nature of the online environment has magnified the threats we face, and has opened up new vectors for harm. We are determined to ensure that the technologies that have been developed to enhance prosperity and freedom are not exploited by those who seek to promote terrorism and violent extremism; prey upon and exploit our children; or spread disinformation and discord to undermine our democratic institutions. The evolution of digital technology has created new opportunities for widespread transmission of child exploitation material, and for perpetrating the most abhorrent kinds of child sexual exploitation, such as live-streaming of abuse. And it is not only in the recesses of the dark web that such material is accessible. Much is hosted on the most common top‑level domains. Moreover, the growing sophistication of mobile technology has enabled offenders to target children, including through apps that can be used to recruit and coerce children to engage in sexual activity. The low financial cost, and the anonymised nature of this criminal enterprise, is contributing to a growth in the sexual exploitation of children. We must escalate government and industry efforts to stop this. We also affirm the need to build upon efforts to counter the use of the internet by terrorists and violent extremists who continue to exploit online spaces to share materials designed to radicalise and mobilise individuals to violence. These materials are used for recruitment, facilitation, training and financing purposes, often with devastating consequences. Governments and industry have made some progress in tackling this issue. However, the task is far from complete. Terrorists and violent extremists remain able to disseminate propaganda promoting violence, and to use online platforms to radicalise and recruit. And, despite concerted efforts, a great deal of terrorist and violent extremist content remains accessible online to anyone inclined to seek it out. We therefore call upon industry to go further in proactively and innovatively addressing the illicit use of their platforms and applications at pace. In this context we welcome and support the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT). But we urge industry leaders to champion more rapid responses, both under the auspices of the GIFCT and beyond. Digital industry must take responsibility to reduce the availability of online terrorist and violent extremist content across all platforms and applications, and to do so comprehensively. Recognizing the G7 Interior Ministers' statement on terrorism and violent extremism, we echo and amplify their call to action, and we affirm that efforts must extend to all types of illegal and illicit online content. We are also increasingly seeing the use of online spaces to spread disinformation, sow division, and undermine our democratic institutions. The proliferation of interference activities and disinformation undermines the trust of citizens in online communications and information, delegitimizing the benefits and opportunities that communications and social media platforms create. We call upon industry to meet public expectations regarding online safety by: Developing and implementing capabilities to prevent illegal and illicit content from ever being uploaded, and to execute urgent and immediate takedown where there is a failure to prevent upload. Deploying human and automated capabilities to seek out and remove legacy content. Acting on previous commitments to invest in automated capabilities and techniques (including photo DNA tools) to detect, remove and prevent re‑upload of illegal and illicit content, as well as content that violates a company's terms of service. Prioritising the protection of the user by building user safety into the design of all online platforms and services, including new technologies before they are deployed. Building upon successful hash sharing efforts to further assist in proactive removal of illicit content. Setting ambitious industry standards, and increasing assistance to smaller companies in developing and deploying illicit content counter-measures. Building and enhancing capabilities to counter foreign interference and disinformation. Preventing live streaming of child sexual abuse on all platforms. We recognise that governments also have a major role to play in addressing the spread of illicit content online. We commit to build the capacity of non-'five eyes' countries to protect and defend the most vulnerable. We undertake to enhance information flows from government to industry, and work towards overcoming barriers to cross-sectoral collaboration. We agree to ensure our enforcement capabilities, including technical data such as hashes, can be shared with industry to support the development of scalable, Artificial Intelligence-driven solutions. Through the same innovation and cross-sectoral collaboration that has underpinned so many technological advances, the challenge of countering illicit online content is not insurmountable. To focus our collective efforts, we agree to establish a senior officials group charged with monitoring industry progress on the above actions on a quarterly basis and reporting back to us. We welcome digital industry Chief Executive Officers to future meetings of the Five Country Ministerial to update us on their efforts directly. 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Full text:
This is Google's cache of https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about/national-security/five-country-ministerial-2018/access-evidence-encryption. It is a snapshot of the page as it appeared on Nov 2, 2018 21:38:38 GMT. The current page could have changed in the meantime. Learn more. Full versionText-only versionView source Tip: To quickly find your search term on this page, press Ctrl+F or ⌘-F (Mac) and use the find bar. Home Menu Department of Immigration and Border Protection Search Skip Navigation LinksHome > About Us > National security > Five Country Ministerial 2018 > Access to evidence and encryption Statement of Principles on Access to Evidence and Encryption Preamble The Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are committed to personal rights and privacy, and support the role of encryption in protecting those rights. Encryption is vital to the digital economy and a secure cyberspace, and to the protection of personal, commercial and government information. However, the increasing use and sophistication of certain encryption designs present challenges for nations in combatting serious crimes and threats to national and global security. Many of the same means of encryption that are being used to protect personal, commercial and government information are also being used by criminals, including child sex offenders, terrorists and organized crime groups to frustrate investigations and avoid detection and prosecution. Privacy laws must prevent arbitrary or unlawful interference, but privacy is not absolute. It is an established principle that appropriate government authorities should be able to seek access to otherwise private information when a court or independent authority has authorized such access based on established legal standards. The same principles have long permitted government authorities to search homes, vehicles, and personal effects with valid legal authority. The increasing gap between the ability of law enforcement to lawfully access data and their ability to acquire and use the content of that data is a pressing international concern that requires urgent, sustained attention and informed discussion on the complexity of the issues and interests at stake. Otherwise, court decisions about legitimate access to data are increasingly rendered meaningless, threatening to undermine the systems of justice established in our democratic nations. Each of the Five Eyes jurisdictions will consider how best to implement the principles of this statement, including with the voluntary cooperation of industry partners. Any response, be it legislative or otherwise, will adhere to requirements for proper authorization and oversight, and to the traditional requirements that access to information is underpinned by warrant or other legal process. We recognize that, in giving effect to these principles, governments may have need to engage with a range of stakeholders, consistent with their domestic environment and legal frameworks. Principles The Attorneys General and Interior Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand affirm the following principles in relation to encryption. 1. Mutual Responsibility Diminished access to the content of lawfully obtained data is not just an issue for Governments alone, but a mutual responsibility for all stakeholders. Providers of information and communications technology and services - carriers, device manufacturers or over-the-top service providers -– are subject to the law, which can include requirements to assist authorities to lawfully access data, including the content of communications. Safe and secure communities benefit citizens and the companies that operate within them. We are always willing to work with technology providers in order to meet our public safety responsibilities and ensure the ability of citizens to protect their sensitive data. Law enforcement agencies in our countries need technology providers to assist with the execution of lawful orders. Currently there are some challenges arising from the increasing use and sophistication of encryption technology in relation to which further assistance is needed. Governments should recognize that the nature of encryption is such that that there will be situations where access to information is not possible, although such situations should be rare. 2. Rule of law and due process are paramount All governments should ensure that assistance requested from providers is underpinned by the rule of law and due process protections. The principle that access by authorities to the information of private citizens occurs only pursuant to the rule of law and due process is fundamental to maintaining the values of our democratic society in all circumstances – whether in their homes, personal effects, devices, or communications. Access to information, subject to this principle, is critical to the ability of governments to protect our citizens by investigating threats and prosecuting crimes. This lawful access should always be subject to oversight by independent authorities and/or subject to judicial review. 3. Freedom of choice for lawful access solutions The Governments of the Five Eyes encourage information and communications technology service providers to voluntarily establish lawful access solutions to their products and services that they create or operate in our countries. Governments should not favor a particular technology; instead, providers may create customized solutions, tailored to their individual system architectures that are capable of meeting lawful access requirements. Such solutions can be a constructive approach to current challenges. Should governments continue to encounter impediments to lawful access to information necessary to aid the protection of the citizens of our countries, we may pursue technological, enforcement, legislative or other measures to achieve lawful access solutions. Australian Border Force (ABF) Who We Are A career with us Border Force officer recruit traineeship Report something suspicious About us
Venezuela Continuing Gold Repatriation Efforts Despite British And USG Obsctruction
Reports are emerging that Venezuela is attempting to repatriate 14 tons of gold from the United Kingdom (archived). The British are obstructing by insisting plans be offered for the gold after it is removed from their custody, though they could be stalling for a lack of actual gold to deliver. Meanwhile new USG sanctions this week target people involved in the gold trade who do business with Venezuela making insurance for the shipment difficult to acquire, but it is not outside the realm of possibility that a Bolivarian Navy warship could ferry 14 tons of cargo across the Atlantic.
Brits Ban TV Ad For Showing Healthy, Human Shaped, Female Model
Over on Airstrip One, a government "Advertising Standards Authority" has banned the continued airing of an advertisement featuring a healthy, athletic, human, and human shaped female with a body mass index of 18.8 by asserting that the size 8 model is "unhealthily underweight" (archived). The hamplanet censor squad cited visible ribs and muscle definition during athletic movements as evidence the 5'10" model was unhealthily underweight during those scenes.
We desperately await the UK's entry of "healthily weighted" athletes into international sporting competitions.
University Of Brighton Takes Ambiguous Position On Program Supporting Coed To Gentlemen Connections
The University of Brighton has taken an ambiguous position on a student sex worker support organization (archived). The organization in question appears to be a sloppy and incomplete implementation of The Gentlement Prefer Coeds Club, while still recognizing that a girl's only 19 once and there's a limited window to extract value from that. The Univeristy is denying that it supports prostitution while saying the organization's existance simply merits "investigation" as an estimated 1 in 6 students derives or has considered deriving income from working their sex.
Brit MMA Fans Cucked By Mammy State Into Watching Pig
British MMA fans tuned in to watch Bellator 206 this morning and were deprived of the opportunity to see the main event when Channel 5 switched off their feed and instead aired "Peppa Pig" (archived). Channel 5 insists they were mandated to make the switch due to Mammy state regulations against airing content with the wrong rating after 6am. The Mammy state governing Airstrip one further requires households with color televisions pay an annual license fee of more than 150 pound no longer sterling for having the ability to view over the air transmissions.
Bellator president Scott Coker announced his intention to prevent this issue in the future, reducing the length of events to accomodate the mammy state.
UK Court Issues No Sanctions Over Gross Violations Of Surveillance Law
In Britain the Investagatory Powers Tribunal has found that MI5 and GCHQ have spent 15 years grossly violating section 94 of the local Telecommunications act through their cable tapping programs (archived). The tribunal's president Michael Burton however found no reason for anything to be done citing a word salad of bureaucratic wank.
Numerous Reports Speculating Ecuador In Negotiations For Imminent Assange Extradition
Numerous reports are suggesting that Eduadorian President Lenín Moreno has entered into negotiations to extradite Julian Assange from the safety of his current residence into the hostile Anglophone territory outside of his embassy suite (archived). Moreno has repeatedly been referring to Assange as "una piedra en el zapato" and had Assange's communication with the outside world restricted earlier this year.
Assange's precarious situation highlights the hazards of trying to interact with fiat states, as just one election has changed the desired foreign policy of his chosen host while his Ecuadorian home is surrounded by an increasingly unstable England.
Johnson Resigns As UK Foreign Secretary Over Impossibility Of May's "Soft" Brexit Effort
Boris Johnson has resigned from Teresa May's British government over the impossibility of implementing and selling May's "soft" Brexit plan (archived). Details of May's "soft" Brexit remain in a constant state of flux with the only constants being the acceptance of punitive sanctions from the European Union without actually escaping the European Union. This development does nothing to make the inevitability of Brexit less likely, but it does indicate a diminished likelyhood Teresa May will be the Prime Minister when Brexit is consumated.